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Auditor economic incentives and
going-concern opinions in a limited
litigious Continental European business
environment: empirical evidence from
Belgium
Ann Vanstraelen*
Abstract—Theory predicts that auditor reporting behaviour may be influenced by the perceived consequences of
disclosing going-concern uncertainty in the audit report (DeAngelo 1981, Watts and Zimmerman 1986). Krishnan
and Krishnan (1996) and Louwers (1998) have addressed this issue empirically in a US context. The results of
Krishnan and Krishnan (1996) suggested that one of the important factors in the auditor's opinion decision is the
risk of litigation. The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between auditor economic incentives and
the propensity to issue going-concern opinions in a limited litigious business environment, Belgium. In spite of the
low risk of litigation and the fact that most Belgian companies are privately held, various regulations have been put
into effect to safeguard audit quality in Belgium. However, the results suggest that the auditor's going-concern
opinion decision in Belgium is associated with factors relating to the perceived consequences of disclosing a going-
concern opinion. Specifically, the results suggest that auditors in Belgium are significantly less likely to issue
going-concern opinions to clients that pay higher audit fees, and when the audit firm has lost a relatively high pro-
portion of its clients in the preceding year. The auditor's going-concern opinion does not appear to be significantly
influenced by the length of the auditor-client relationship, year of the auditor engagement period, and auditor type.
The results of this study are to some extent different from the study by Louwers (1998), in which none of the in-
centive variables related to the auditor's loss function was significant.
1. Introduction
In the literature, it is argued that auditor reporting
behaviour may be influenced by the perceived
consequences of disclosing going-concern uncer-
tainty in the audit report (DeAngelo, 1981a; Watts
and Zimmerman, 1986). It is suggested that an au-
ditor deciding to disclose going-concern uncer-
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tainty in the audit report potentially faces econom-
ic trade-offs, in terms of expected costs of losing a
client, being exposed to third-party lawsuits and
loss of reputation (Krishnan and Krishnan, 1996:
566).
This issue was addressed empirically in a US
context by Krishnan and Krishnan (1996) and
Louwers (1998). Krishnan and Krishnan's results
(1996: 583) suggested that one of the important
factors in the auditor's opinion decision is the risk
of litigation. Louwers (1998: 154) did not find ev-
idence to support the contention that auditors'
going-concern opinion decisions are systematical-
ly influenced by incentives associated with the au-
ditor's loss function.
This study aims at examining the relation be-
tween auditor economic incentives and the
propensity to issue going-concern opinions in a
limited litigious business environment, i.e.
Belgium. The choice of a continental European
country is motivated by the fact that nearly all pub-
lished studies on the auditor's going-concern opin-
ion decision and its related aspects focus on an
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Anglo-American business environment. Hopwood
et al. (1994: 426) stressed the importance of re-
search on the auditor's going-concern opinion de-
cision in other than Anglo-American countries.
Despite the low risk of litigation and the fact that
most Belgian companies are privately held, vari-
ous regulations have been put into effect to safe-
guard audit quality in Belgium, However, this
study provides empirical evidence which suggests
that the auditor's going-concern opinion decision
in Belgium is associated with factors relating to
the perceived consequences of disclosing a going-
concern opinion. In particular, auditors in Belgium
appear to be significantly less likely to issue a
going-concern opinion to a client that pays higher
audit fees, and when the audit firm has suffered
client losses in the preceding year. In addition, this
study shows that the auditor's going-concern opin-
ion decision is significantly related to: the finan-
cial condition of the client; the location of the
client; a delay in the holding of the annual general
meeting of shareholders, which may suggest
lengthy auditor-client negotiations and extensive
auditor testing; and bad news in the annual report
of the Board of Directors, which tends to decrease
the conflict of interest between the auditor and the
client management.
The remainder of the paper is organised as fol-
lows. First, as a general background, prior research
on the auditor's going-concern opinion decision is
briefly discussed. Second, the characteristics of
the Belgian audit services market are discussed.
Third, the research design and research methodol-
ogy are discussed. Fourth, the results of the analy-
sis are presented. Finally, conclusions are drawn.
2. Background
During the past two decades, auditors' responsibil-
ity for assessing the appropriateness of the going-
concern assumption in the financial statements of
their clients has become the subject of much de-
bate in the auditing profession and considerable re-
search by academics. This increased attention is
due to the fact that auditors appear to be reluctant
to disclose existing going-concern problems in
their audit reports. Indeed, many companies in the
year prior to bankruptcy receive an audit report in
which no going-concern uncertainty is disclosed
(Menon and Schwartz, 1987; Hopwood et al.,
1991; Citron and Taffler, 1992; Carcello et al.,
1997; Lennox, 1999a). Moreover, the ability of
going-concern opinions to predict or identify fail-
ing companies is inferior to bankruptcy prediction
models (Mutchler, 1985; Koh and Kilough, 1990;
Hopwood et al., 1991; Nogler, 1995). This is a pe-
culiar observation, as one would expect auditors,
who after all have access to internal information,
to have more relevant data at their disposal. This
raises questions about auditors' behaviour in re-
sponse to a going-concern uncertainty and how the
auditor arrives at the going-concern opinion deci-
sion.
On the basis of the going-concern opinion liter-
ature, it can be stated that the auditor's going-
concern opinion decision consists of two stages
(Krishnan and Krishnan, 1996: 567). In the first
stage, the auditor evaluates information to form an
initial impression of an entity's financial condi-
tion. In the second stage, the auditor will decide on
the type of audit report to be issued. Referring to
DeAngelo's (1981b) definition of audit quality, the
first stage depends on the auditor's competence,
while the second stage depends on the auditor's in-
dependence. Research has confirmed that auditors
have the ability to identify a company with going-
concern problems (Kida, 1980; Campisi and
Trotman, 1985; Citron and Taffier, 1992; Barnes
and DenHuan, 1993). However, auditor independ-
ence has been questioned. It has been suggested in
the literature that if an auditor acts as a rational
economic agent, the auditor may be influenced by
the perceived consequences of issuing a going-
concern report (DeAngelo, 1981a; Watts and
Zimmerman, 1986). Risk of litigation, risk of loss
of reputation and risk of audit loss are factors sug-
gested in the literature which may relate to the eco-
nomic trade-offs faced by the auditor (Krishnan
and Krishnan, 1996: 566). Consequently, these
factors could influence the auditor's going-con-
cern opinion decision. Audit loss subsequent to the
issuance ofa going-concern opinion can occur due
to auditor switching or due to bankruptcy of the
client. The belief that a client will go bankrupt as
a result of a going-concern uncertainty disclosure
in the audit report is known in the literature as the
self-fulfilling prophecy hypothesis (Mutchler,
1984: 24). The risk of litigation and risk of loss of
reputation may have a positive effect on auditor in-
dependence, while the risk of audit loss may com-
promise auditor independence.
Two previous studies (Krishnan and Krishnan,
1996; Louwers, 1998) based on US data examined
the role of economic trade-offs in the auditor's
opinion decision. Louwers (1998: 154) did not
find evidence to support the contention that audi-
tors' going-concern opinion decisions are system-
atically influenced by incentive factors associated
with the auditor's loss function. The following in-
centive factors were included in the study:
prospective audit fees, the length of the auditor-
client relationship, recent auditor litigation, client
losses and the existence of previously disclosed
evidence of going-concern difficulties. Krishnan
and Krishnan (1996: 583) provided evidence that
the auditor's litigation risk is an important factor in
the auditor's opinion decision. Auditors in the US
may perceive that the risk of litigation exceeds the
potential losses of not disclosing going-concern
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uncertainty. The results of a study based on
Flemish companies' (Vanstraelen, 1999: 53) sug-
gest that recent client loss on the part of the audi-
tor appears to moderate the willingness of the
auditor to disclose going-concern uncertainty.
Caution is needed with respect to the generalisa-
tion of these results given the small sample size
and the fact that the observations relate to one year
and to one part of the country.
Theoretical research (Melumad and Thoman,
1990; Dye, 1993; Acemoglu and Gietzmann,
1997) has demonstrated the crucial role legal lia-
bility plays in safeguarding auditor independence.
Analytically, it has also been shown that it is less
costly for auditors to be conservative with clients
that are nearing bankruptcy, since the type 11 error
cost (misclassification of a failing company as a
non-failing company) is typically larger than the
type I error cost (misclassification of a non-failing
company as a failing company) (Matsumara et al.,
1997: 731). Recently, these theoretical findings
were supported by empirical evidence in the US
(DeFond and Subramanyam, 1999). Moreover,
Carcello and Palmrose (1994: 2) reported that
bankruptcy is one of the most frequent sources of
litigation against auditors: 74% of the auditors of
clients that go bankrupt are sued.
The purpose of this study is to assess whether
the auditor's propensity to disclose going-concern
uncertainty is influenced by economic incentives
related to the auditor's loss function in a limited
litigious Continental European business environ-
ment. The incentive variables considered in this
study are: expected audit revenues, recent loss of
audit clients, tenure and auditor type. The first
three incentive variables were also used by
Louwers (1998). It has been shown that litigation
rates in Continental Europe are rather low in com-
parison with the US and the UK (Kinney, 1994;
Mueller et al., 1994; Gietzmann and Quick, 1998).
This study will be carried out in Belgium: a typi-
' Belgium consists of two major parts: Flanders and
Wallonia. Flanders is the Flemish-speaking part, while
Wallonia is the French-speaking part.
^ The following description is based on Lefebvre and
Flower (1994), Block and Jorissen (1995), Buijink et al.
(1996), Meuwissen (1999); Vanstraelen (2000); and
Gaeremynck and Willekens (2001).
' The Law on Bookkeeping considers a company to be large
if it either exceeds more than one of the following criteria: (i)
average number of persons employed on annual basis is 50;
(ii) annual turnover, exclusive VAT, 6,250,000; (iii) balance
sheet total, 3,125,000 or whose average number of employ-
ees during the period exceeds 100.
'' The Institute of Auditors is a public institute under the au-
thority of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and is assisted by
the High Council for Auditing and Accounting. Belgian
Company Law requires that statutory audits of entities under
prudential control (e.g. listed companies, banks and other fi-
nancial institutions, insurance companies and hospitals) can
only be performed by auditors approved by the various official
bodies regulating those industries.
cal Continental European country. In Belgium, ac-
counting is governed by legal rules, banks and
other financial institutions play a central role in
corporate financing, financial reporting is strongly
influenced by tax considerations and financial re-
porting is creditor oriented (Lefebvre and Flower,
1994; Block and Jorissen, 1995). In addition, most
Belgian firms are privately held and ownership is
concentrated in both family-owned as well as pub-
lic companies. Given the rather limited litigious
business environment in Continental Europe, con-
cern arises as to whether the independence of au-
ditors is compromised or whether it is safeguarded
by other incentives.
3. Characteristics of the Belgian audit
services market^
The purpose of this section is to provide an
overview of the Belgian institutional framework
within which the results of this study should be in-
terpreted. Audit regulation in Belgium is discussed
by focusing on the following aspects: audit re-
quirement; auditor independence; auditor liability;
and auditor reporting.
3.1. Audit requirement
The statutory audit of companies in Belgium is
governed by Company Law. Companies that meet
specific legal form and size criteria^ are required to
have their financial statements audited by a mem-
ber of the Institute of Auditors."* The statutory au-
ditor needs to examine the company's financial
situation and its financial statements, consisting of
the balance sheet, the profit and loss account and
the notes. Subsequently, the auditor has to form an
opinion as to whether the financial statements con-
vey a faithful picture (Nobes, 1993: 42) of the
company's shareholders' equity and the financial
position at the balance sheet date, and whether the
year's results are in accordance with the legal and
administrative requirements. The audit has to be
conducted in accordance with the generally ac-
cepted auditing standards promulgated by the
Institute of Auditors (Block and Jorissen, 1995).
The General Meeting of Shareholders appoints the
statutory auditor on the basis of a recommendation
by the Board of Directors. The term of appoint-
ment is three years, which can subsequently be re-
newed without limitation for further three-yearly
periods. A works council has the right to refuse the
appointment of the nominee auditor and defend
this position in court. There are works' councils in
all Belgian companies and institutions that employ
on average more than one hundred workers. The
works council is a body with equal representation
of employers and employees. Its purpose is to im-
plement social legislation. The works council is
entitled to adequate financial and economic infor-
mation about the entity. Auditors can only be dis-
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missed during their mandate under very exception-
al circumstances.^ Resignation of the auditor dur-
ing his mandate is likewise restricted.
3.2. Independence
The statutory auditor in Belgium is subject to a
strict code of ethics and auditing standards. Many
of the regulations are aimed at protecting auditor
independence. The principal regulations concern-
ing auditor independence are the following.
Auditors are not allowed to accept an engagement
when they have a personal or commercial relation-
ship with the client, a financial interest in the client
or fee-dependence. Moreover, it is prohibited for
an auditor to accept an engagement if he has been
a director or manager of that client in the past three
years. It is also forbidden for audit firms to provide
other services (e.g. tax, legal services, consulting)
to an audit client within the same legal entity, with
the exception of the provision of bookkeeping and
accounting services on an ad hoc and non-recur-
ring basis. Auditors are not allowed to be em-
ployed full-time outside the auditing profession. If
so, they lose their licence. Furthermore, all forms
of advertising and unsolicited offerings of services
to the public in general are forbidden. The auditing
profession has also created some mechanisms to
monitor its members. Auditors are required to re-
port to the Institute of Auditors the number of
hours worked for and the fee charged to each of
their clients. Moreover, each audit firm is subject-
ed to a peer review at least once every five years.
Finally, the Institute of Auditors imposes discipli-
nary sanctions against auditors violating the
Ethical Code.
3.3. Liability
The auditor's report and the financial statements
have to be filed with the Belgian National Bank
and are publicly available. Legal action against an
auditor in Belgium can be undertaken by the client
company, its shareholders, or any interested third
party. Belgium has adopted the proportional liabil-
ity system, placing liability upon the defendants
according to their contribution to the damage.
However, liability can neither be capped by law
nor by contract. Belgian statutory auditors are not
required to maintain professional indemnity insur-
ance. Legal action against a statutory auditor can
be undertaken within the five years after the issue
of the auditor's report. Litigation rates in Belgium
' For example, physical incapacity or negligence resulting
in a loss of confidence.
'' It is noted that during the period under study 1992-1996,
the subtype of audit opinion 'unqualified audit opinion with an
explanatory paragraph' was not yet recognised by the Belgian
Institute of Auditors. However, 4 out of the 1,176 companies
in our sample did receive an unqualified report that mention
going-concern problems. These four reports were coded as re-
ports disclosing a going-concern uncertainty.
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are low (Vanstraelen, 1999; Gaeremynck and
Willekens, 2001). This is a typical characteristic of
countries which have government-prescribed ac-
counting standards that are rather conservative,
while banks or the government are the major
providers of capital (Mueller et al., 1994).
3.4. Audit report
The auditing standards with respect to the form
and content of the Belgian audit report are issued
by the Institute of Auditors. The Belgian auditing
profession distinguishes between six types of audit
opinions to be issued under specific circum-
stances: an unqualified opinion; an unqualified
opinion with an explanatory paragraph; a qualified
opinion; a qualified opinion with an explanatory
paragraph; a disclaimer of opinion and an adverse
opinion. An important characteristic of the Belgian
audit report is the fact that it contains two parts.
The first part of the audit report, which is similar
to the audit report in most countries, provides an
opinion on the financial statements. The statutory
auditor describes the applied auditing standards,
the objectives of the audit, how he has carried out
the audit, and whether he has obtained all the re-
quired information and explanations from the di-
rectors and management. The auditor concludes
with an opinion on whether the annual accounts
give a faithful picture (Nobes, 1993: 42) of the
company's net worth, the financial position and
the results of the year. The second part of the
Belgian audit report is different from most coun-
tries as it provides additional statements and infor-
mation, which are required by Company Law
(Article 144). In particular, the auditor expresses
an opinion on whether the annual report of the
Board of Directors contains the information re-
quired by law and agrees with the annual accounts.
T"he additional statements and information are pri-
marily for the use of the works council in order to
better inform and protect employees.
If the auditor is confronted with significant
going-concern problems, he will draw attention to
this fact in the first part of his audit report. The au-
ditor is also required to modify the second part of
his report if he feels that the annual report does not
contain the information required by law, i.e. a jus-
tification for the continuation of business opera-
tions if necessary. The following situations may
occur. First, if the Board of Directors has described
the going-concern uncertainty correctly in its an-
nual report or in the notes to the financial state-
ments, the statutory auditor will issue an
unqualified report regarding this item. However,
he is required to elucidate his judgment in an ex-
planatory paragraph* in which attention is drawn
to the existence of a risk in terms of continuity.
Second, if the Board of Directors has provided in-
appropriate infonnation in the notes to the annual
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Statements or in the annual report, the statutory au-
ditor will issue a qualified opinion. Third, a dis-
claimer of opinion is justified if the statutory
auditor is unable to collect the required informa-
tion for evaluating the going-concern status of the
company. Finally, if the statutory auditor concludes
after his audit that the going-concern assumption
used by the Board of Directors for the preparation
of the annual statements is inappropriate, he will
issue an adverse opinion. If there is a difference of
opinion regarding the going-concern assumption
used by the Board of Directors, he will issue an
adverse opinion that mentions explicitly that this
difference of opinion exists.
4. Research design and research
methodology
4.1. Sample
While standard American databases like
Compustat allow going-concern researchers to
search on the type of audit report (standard un-
qualified report, modified unqualified report, qual-
ified report, disclaimer report and adverse report),
this is not possible with Belgian databases.''
Therefore, a different sample design was chosen.
The design of the study started from the entire
population of large^ Belgian companies that went
bankrupt in the period 1992-1996. For each large
company that was declared bankrupt in the period
1992-1996, we attempted to collect the audit re-
port on the financial statements submitted to the
Belgian National Bank in the year prior to bank-
ruptcy. Companies for which no data were avail-
able were excluded (30%). Excluding companies
belonging to the same group of companies (6%)
further reduced the number of bankrupt companies
included in the sample. Only one bankrupt compa-
' CDROMs containing the financial statements of Belgian
companies submitted to the Belgian National Bank.
^ A company is considered to be large if it either exceeds
more than one of the following criteria: (i) average number of
persons employed on annual basis is 50; (ii) annual turnover,
exclusive VAT, BFr. 145m; (iii) balance sheet total, BFr.70m or
whose average number of employees during the period ex-
ceeds 100. These size criteria were adjusted by Article I,
Royal Decree 27 April 1995 into: annual turnover, exclusive
VAT, BFr.200m and balance sheet total, BFr. 100m. It is noted
that the size criteria were revised again recently and apply to
companies with fiscal year end 31 December 1999: annual
turnover, exclusive VAT, 6,250,000 and balance sheet total,
3,125,000.
' The DSCORE is calculated from the general multiple lin-
ear discriminant model, developed for Belgian companies,
consisting of the following ratios: accumulated profit (loss) &
reserves/total liabilities; taxes and social security
charges/short-term external liabilities; cash/restricted current
assets; work in progress & finished goods/restricted current
assets; short-term fmancial debts/ short term external liabili-
ties. The DSCORE of the general bankruptcy prediction
model has a prediction accuracy of 75.6% when using the op-
timal cut-off point of DSCORE=0.1304 (Ooghe and Van
Wymeersch, 1991; Ooghe, Joos and de Bourdeaudhuij, 1995).
ny, usually the parent company of the group of
bankrupt companies was included in the sample.
This procedure was followed to avoid double
counts, since the same auditor would issue the
same audit opinion to all companies of the group
that went bankrupt. The final sample contained
392 bankrupt companies. Subsequently, a second
sample was created containing 392 financially
stressed non-bankrupt large Belgian companies.
Using common criteria in the literature (Mutchler,
1985; Hopwood et al., 1994), a company is con-
sidered to be financially stressed if it has either
suffered an operational loss, a bottom line loss, or
negative retained earnings in the current year or
previous two years or has a negative working cap-
ital in the previous two years.
Finally, a control sample containing 392 finan-
cially non-stressed non-bankrupt large Belgian
companies was created. Menon and Schwartz
(1985: 255) stressed the importance of matching
control groups of companies by industry and size.
Hence the three samples were matched by year, in-
dustry (using four-digit NACE-code) and size
(based on total assets). The sample design of this
study is similar to the UK study of Citron and
Taffler (1992). However, in this study an addition-
al control sample is created containing financially
non-stressed non-bankrupt firms. For each of the
three samples of companies. Table 1 illustrates the
financial condition and the proportions of type of
audit reports issued to these companies.
The financial condition of a company is meas-
ured by the general discriminant score (DSCORE)
of a standard bankruptcy prediction model devel-
oped for Belgian companies.' The descriptive sta-
tistics in Table 1 show that the sample of bankrupt
companies is more financially stressed compared
with the sample of financially stressed non-bank-
rupt companies. Table 1 further shows that after
analysing the audit reports issued to the 392 bank-
rupt firms in the sample one year prior to bank-
ruptcy, it appears that only in 37% of the cases is a
going-concern uncertainty disclosed. In other
words, in 63% of the cases auditors did not men-
tion going-concern problems one year prior to
bankruptcy. Comparison of this base-rate frequen-
cy with similar research in the US shows that the
proportion of bankrupt companies with a going-
concern qualification in the US is on average high-
er, ranging from 39% to 54% prior to SAS-59 and
from 54% to 62% since the implementation of
SAS-59"' (Koh, 1991; Raghunandan and Rama,
1995; Carcello et al., 1997). This finding is in line
with the expectation that auditors in continental
European countries are more reluctant to express
going-concern uncertainty in the audit report, pos-
sibly due to the differences in the legal and institu-
tional environment between continental European
countries and the US.
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Table 1
Sample proportions,
GLOBAL:
1992-1996
DSCORE'
Unqualified audit
report
Hnancial condition and type of audit reports issued
Sample bankrupt
firms
n = 392
mean: -2.77
25th percentile.: -1.68
median: -0.58
75th percentile.: 0.07
163(41.6%)
Other than unqualified
audit report:
because of going-
concern uncertainty
by issuing:
qualified opinion
disclaimer of opinion
adverse opinion
because of other
reasons
by issuing:
qualified opinion
disclaimer of opinion
adverse opinion
145 (37%)
102 (70%)
35 (24%)
8 (6%)
84(21.4%)
60(71%)
21 (25%)
3 (4%)
'DSCORE: The financial condition of a company
bankruptcy prediction
Sample financially
stressed non-
bankrupt fiirms
mean: -0.47
25th percentile.: -0.90
median: -0.09
75th percentile.: 0.56
293 (74.8%)
53 (13.5%)
49 (92%)
4 (8%)
0 (0%)
46(11.7%)
34 (74%)
12 (26%)
0 (0%)
Sample financially Total
non-stressed non- n = 1176
bankrupt firms
mean: 1.48
25th percentile.: 0.61
median: 1.23
75th percentile.: 2.27
370 (94.4%)
0 (0%)
22 (5.6%)
17 (77%)
5 (23%)
0 (0%)
is measured by the general discriminant score of a standard
model developed for Belgian companies. The DSCORE is calculated from the general
multiple linear discriminant model consisting of the following ratios: accumulated profit (loss) & reserves/total
liabilities; taxes and social security charges/short-term external liabilities;
in progress & finished goods/restricted current assets; short-term financial
The DSCORE of the
cash/restricted current assets; work
debts/ short term external liabilities.
general bankruptcy prediction model has a prediction accuracy of 75.6% when using
the optimal cut-off point of DSCORE=0.1304
Bourdeaudhuij 1995).
(Ooghe and Van Wymeersch 1991, Ooghe, Joos and de
'" In the US the auditor's responsibility with respect to the
going-concern issue has been increased by replacing in 1988
SAS-34 ('The auditor's considerations when a question arises
on an entity's continued existence') with SAS-59 ('The audi-
tor's consideration of an entity's ability to continue as a going
concern'). The main consequence of the change of standard is
that the task of assessing a company's ability to continue as a
going concern has been transformed from a negative into an
affirmative duty.
" Gaeremynck and Willekens (2001) selected a sample of
114 Belgian companies that had terminated their business op-
erations due to bankruptcy or voluntary liquidation in 1995 or
1996, and reported that 45.61% received an unqualified opin-
ion. A subdivision of the results between banknipt and liqui-
dated firms showed that of the 52 bankrupt firms 21%
received an unqualified opinion in the year prior to bankrupt-
cy, whereas of the 62 liquidated firms 66% received an un-
qualified opinion in the year prior to liquidation. It Is noted
that the 392 bankrupt companies included in my sample rep-
resent all companies that were declared bankrupt in the period
1992-1996 of which the audit report one year prior to bank-
ruptcy was available.
Besides focusing on going-concern tincertainty
disclosure (GCUD), one can also look at all audit
reports issued other than unqualified. It appears
that auditors do not mention any probletn in 41.6%
of the cases." When comparing this percentage
with the percentage of no going-concern uncer-
tainty disclosure, one could deduce that there are
three types of auditor reporting behaviour:
1. Issue a qualified opinion, disclaimer of opinion
or adverse opinion in which going-concern un-
certainty is disclosed;
2. Issue a qualified opinion, disclaimer of opinion
or adverse opinion without disclosing going-
concern uncertainties;
3. Issue an unqualified audit report without men-
tioning any kind of problem.
The second type of auditor reporting behaviour
could be considered as a kind of substitution. The
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auditor substitutes the disclosure of going-concerti
problems hy the disclosure of other types of prob-
lems. The proportions of other types of problems
disclosed iti the audit reports for bankrupt compa-
nies that are not unqualified (qualified opinion,
disclaimer of opinion and adverse opinion) are:
valuation assets (23%); had debts (21%); weak
system of internal control (16%); first year of first
audit mandate (12%); contingent liabilities (7%);
scope limitation (2%); more than one of these
problems (19%). These other types of problems
could actually lead to bankruptcy, but it is not ex-
plicitly mentioned. It is left to the judgment of the
users of the financial statements.
Tahle 1 further shows that of the 392 financially
stressed non-bankrupt companies in year t, nearly
75% received an unqualified audit report in year t-
1. In 13.5% of the cases, potential going-concern
problems were disclosed. Approximately 12% of
the companies received a qualified report, dis-
claimer of opinion or adverse opinion, without an
explicit going-concern uncertainty disclosure.
Finally, Table 1 shows that the total control sample
of financially non-stressed non-bankrupt compa-
nies contains 392 firms of which nearly 95% of the
firms received an unqualified audit report.
4.2. Model variables
INCENTIVE VARIABLES
The primary focus of this study is to see whether
auditors' incentives related to the auditor's loss
function significantly infiuence the auditor's going-
concem opinion decision. Four variables are con-
sidered which relate to the auditor's loss function.
First, the economic interest of the auditor in a
client is a crucial factor in the auditor's loss func-
tion. Two variables are used to measure the eco-
nomic interest of an auditor in a client. The first
variable is the auditor's revenues from the auditor-
client relationship (LNFEE). It is expected that
higher audit fees will decrease the willingness of
the auditor to disclose going-concern uncertainty.
Given the fact that information on actual audit fees
is not publicly available, a proxy is needed. Audit
fees are proxied hy the natural logarithm of the
sum of operational and financial revenues. This
proxy is supported by the fact that the Belgian
Institute of Auditors (IBR) developed scales for
audit fees, based on the average numher of audit
working hours, which is considered to depend on
the sum of total assets, operational and financial
revenues. Total assets are not included in the audit
fee proxy since it was one of the matching criteria
for the non-hankrupt companies. The fact that
there may be economies of scale in auditing, in the
sense that large audits cost less per unit of asset or
transaction audited than small audits, is usually
dealt with by making the size variable a logarith-
mic function (Pong and Whittington, 1994).
The second variable is recent loss or gain of
audit clients (CLIENTLOSS) to measure the eco-
nomic interest of an auditor in a client. Recent
client loss or gain was measured hy the net change
in the numher of clients during the previous year,
scaled hy the total numher of clients of the audit
firm.'^ Recent loss of audit clients may either in-
crease the economic incentives of the audit firm to
retain its current clients or may be related to audit
firm conservatism (Louwers, 1998: 148).
The third variable is the type of auditor : Big 6
audit firm or non-Big 6 audit firm (B6NB6).'-'
Large audit firms are assumed to deliver better
quality (DeAngelo, 1981h; Palmrose, 1988;
Davidson and Neu, 1993; Lennox, 1999b) by
being not only more capable of discovering a
breach in the client's accounting system but also
more willing to disclose the breach due to reputa-
tion concerns. Therefore it is expected that Big 6
audit firms will he more likely to disclose going-
concern uncertainty compared to non-Big 6 audit
firms, all other things equal.
Fourth, the length of the auditor-client relation-
ship (TENURE) may also be related to the audi-
tor's loss function and affect the auditor's
going-concern opinion decision. Based on the
common perception that long tenure would com-
promise auditor independence (Levinthal and
Fichman, 1985; Deis and Giroux, 1992), it is ex-
pected that long tenure will decrease the likelihood
of the auditor to disclose going-concern uncertainty.
Finally, Belgian legislation requires a minimal
length of the audit mandate of three years. During
their mandate, auditors can be dismissed only
under very exceptional circumstances. The audit
mandate can be renewed without limitation, but al-
ways for three-yearly periods. Therefore, it is
questioned whether the auditor's reporting behav-
iour in the first years of the audit mandate differs
from the last year of the mandate (MANDATE). It
could be expected that the incumbent auditor is
more willing to make compromises with the
client's management in the last year of his official
mandate in the hope of renewing his mandate.
It is acknowledged that there may be other in-
centive variables related to the auditor's loss func-
tion which are not captured by the model. An
example would be the provision of management
advisory services. The impact of the provision of
management advisory services on the auditor's re-
porting behaviour could not be measured. In
Belgium, management advisory services are pro-
'^  An interesting alternative way to measure client loss
would be to take into account the size of clients lost/gained.
However, the cost of manual collection of these data in
Belgium is prohibitive.
" The data of this study relate to the period 1992-1996. In
that period, there were still six Big audit firms instead of the
current Big 5 audit firms.
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vided by separate legal entities that are not re-
quired to make these data available.
CONTROL AND INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES
In addition to the incentive variables relating to
the auditor's loss function, some control and insti-
tutional variables were included in this study in
order to reduce the likelihood of correlated omitted
variables. The choice of variables is supported by
prior research on the auditor's going-concern opin-
ion decision and institutional factors. The follow-
ing variables were considered. The first variable is
a bankruptcy dummy (BANKRUPT), which
serves as an ex-post control for financial health. It
can be expected that there is a strong correlation
between bankruptcy and the likelihood of a going-
concern uncertainty disclosure.
The second variable is the time lag hetween the
closing of the fiscal year and the submission of the
financial statements to the Belgian National Bank.
In this respect, a distinction is made between a
delay of the annual general meeting of sharehold-
ers (GMDELAY) and a submission lag (SUBM-
LAG)''' of the financial statements to the Belgian
National Bank. Belgian Company Law requires
that the annual general meeting of shareholders
takes place within six months after the closing of
the fiscal year. The maximum submission time of
the financial statements to the Belgian National
Bank is thirty days after the annual general meet-
ing of shareholders. It can be expected that com-
panies with financial difficulties tend to delay the
holding of the annual general meeting of share-
holders and the submission of the financial state-
ments to the Belgian National Bank and are more
likely to receive a going-concern uncertainty dis-
closure. A delay of the annual general meeting can
be expected due to lengthy auditor-client negotia-
tions that go with the disclosure of a going-con-
cern uncertainty in the audit report. A submission
lag can be expected since problem companies may
want to defer potentially negative consequences
''' A combination of the two variables, GMDELAY and
SUBMLAG, into one LAG variable (lag between year-end
and submission date) results in a significant positive regres-
sion coefficient of the LAG variable. The reason why I split
the total lag into a GMDELAY and a SUBMLAG is to get
more refined results. The results show that only the GMDE-
LAY variable is significant, but not the SUBMLAG variable.
" The bankruptcy ratio, defined as the number of bankrupt-
cies divided by the number of establishments, is the highest in
Brussels, on average 0.39 during the period 1991-1996, fol-
lowed by Wallonia, on average 0.28 and Flanders, 0.22. The
number of bankruptcies divided by the total number of com-
panies follows the same pattern, ranging on average from
0.027 in Brussels during the period 1992-1996, to 0.020 in
Wallonia and 0.017 in Flanders (calculations based on data
provided by the NIS).
" It is noted that the causal relationship is difficult to dis-
entangle. However, legally the report of the Board of Directors
should be issued prior to the auditor's report.
related to the public announcement of the receipt
of an audit report disclosing a going-concern un-
certainty.
The third variable is the location of the client
company. A distinction is made between whether
the company is located in Brussels (LOCB),
Wallonia (LOCW) or Flanders (LOCF, region of
reference). Given the fact that the prohability of
bankruptcy is the highest in Brussels, followed by
Wallonia and Flanders,'^ it could be expected that
a competent auditor would take the economic con-
dition of the country into account.
Finally, the institutional variable bad news in the
annual report of the Board of Directors (BAD-
NEWS) is included in the model. Belgian
Company Law requires an auditor to refer in the
audit report to the annual report of the Board of
Directors by stating whether it contains all the
statutory information and whether it is in accor-
dance with the financial statements. It is expected
that bad news in the annual report of the Board of
Directors will increase the likelihood of a going-
concern uncertainty disclosure in the audit report
since it would reduce the conflict of interest be-
tween the auditor and the client's management.'*
It is acknowledged that, notwithstanding these
control and institutional variables, a potential
omitted variable problem in the going-concern
opinion model can never entirely be overcome.
For example, the model does not control for per-
sistence in audit reporting by including prior audit
opinions. The data collection of prior audit opin-
ions for all companies in our sample would have
been prohibitively expensive.'^
4.3. Research methodology
Given the special estimation problems related to
binary dependent variables (Maddala, 1991), a lo-
gistic regression model was used to assess the in-
cremental contribution of each incentive variable
of interest while controlling for the variables de-
scribed above. As mentioned, three choice-based
samples were drawn with unequal population
rates. The number of bankrupt companies is small-
er than the number of financially stressed non-
bankrupt companies, which is in turn smaller than
the number of financially non-stressed non-bank-
rupt firms. Maddala (1991: 793) argues that if this
choice-based sample is used to estimate a logit
model, no weighting procedure is needed. The co-
efficients of the explanatory variables are not af-
fected by the unequal sampling rates. It is only the
constant term that is affected.
The model looks as follows:
GCUD = Po + Pi LNFEE -i- P2 CLIENTLOSS + p3
B6NB6 + p4 TENURE + P5 MANDATE -t- p6
BANKRUPT -I- P7 GMDELAY-t- Pg SUBMLAG -1-
P9 LOCB -t- Pio LOCW -I- PI I BADNEWS -I- e
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where:
GCUD Going-concern uncertainty disclo-
sure in the audit report, binary
variable (GCUD - 1, in case
going-concern uncertainty is dis-
closed).
LNFEE Natural logarithm of the firm audit
fees for the client company, prox-
ied by the sum of operational and
financial revenues.
CL/ENTLOSS Number of clients lost or gained
by the audit ftrm during the previ-
ous year scaled by the annual
number of firm clients (loss = —;
gain = H-l
B6NB6 Big 6 auditor or non-Big 6 auditor,
binary variable (B6NB6 = 1, in
case of Big 6 auditor).
TENURE Length of the auditor-client rela-
tionship in years.
MANDATE Indicates in which year of his/her
engagement period (mandate) the
auditor is, binary variable (MAN-
DATE = 1, in case auditor is in
last year of his/her official en-
gagement period).
BANKRUPT Client company went bankrupt or
survived, binary variable (BANK-
RUPT = 1, in case of bankruptcy).
GMDELAY Number of months between the
closing of the fiscal year and the
date of the annual general meeting
of shareholders.
SUBMLAG Number of days between the date
of the annual general meeting of
shareholders and the date of sub-
mission of the financial statements
to the Belgian National Bank.
" In Belgium, audit opinions are not publicly available on
CD-ROMS. They have to be bought as a hard copy from the
National Bank.
'" Article (103, Alarmprocedure) states: 'If net assets are
less than 50% of the subscribed capital, the Board of Directors
is required to convene the members of the General Meeting,
who must decide on the basis of the Board's reorganisation
plans whether or not to continue the entity. The diagnosis
should take into account the specific characteristics of the en-
tity at the closing date of the financial year, as well as events
between this closing date and the date on which the Boards of
Directors approves the annual statements and submits them to
the General Meeting'. Article (104) says that 'if net assets are
below the minimal amount any interested party may appeal to
the court to dissolve the company'.
LOCB Location of client company in
Brussels, binary variable (LOCB
= 1, in case company is located in
Brussels).
LOCW Location of client company in
Wallonia, binary variable (LOCW
= 1, in case company is located in
Wallonia).
BADNEWS Bad news score based on bad
news in the annual report of the
Board of Directors (bad news is
considered to be disclosure of:
important negative events after
closing of the fiscal year; circum-
stances which can negatively in-
fluence the development of the
company; application of Article
103/104 of Belgian Company
Law; '^  other bad news).
5. Results and analysis
5.7. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents summary descriptive statistics
of the explanatory variables for the entire sample
as well as for the sample of companies with and
without a GCUD in the audit report.
Table 2 shows that companies with a going-con-
cern uncertainty disclosure in the audit report gen-
erate significantly lower audit fees compared to
companies without a going-concern uncertainty
disclosure in the audit report. It is significantly
more likely that companies without a going-con-
cern uncertainty disclosure in the audit report were
audited by an audit firm that recently lost audit
clients. Big 6 audit firms disclose significantly
more going-concern uncertainties in their audit re-
ports compared with non-Big 6 audit firms. Going-'
concern uncertainty disclosure in the audit report
occurs significantly more in the case of a relative-
ly short auditor-client relationship. A significant
difference was also found for the variable man-
date. However, the direction of the relationship is
opposite to our expectations.
With respect to the control variables, it can be
seen that, as expected, companies with a going-
concern uncertainty disclosure in the audit report
have a bad financial condition, have significantly
delayed their annual general meeting, are signifi-
cantly more likely to be located in Brussels and
Wallonia, and have significantly more bad news
disclosed in the annual report of the Board of
Directors. The only control variable that is not
significant in the univariate analysis is a submis-
sion lag of the financial statements to the Belgian
National Bank. Therefore, the SUBMLAG vari-
able is dropped in the multivariate analysis.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis
Disclosure) over the period 1992-1996
A. Descriptive statistics Mean
LNFEE
CLIENTLOSS'
B6NB6
TENURE
MANDATE
BANKRUPT
GMDELAY
SUBMLAG
LOCB
LOCW
LOCF
BADNEWS
' CLIENTLOSS:
These cases were
B. Univariate
analysis
LNFEE
CLIENTLOSS
TENURE
GMDELAY
SUBMLAG
BADNEWS
11.92
6.62
0.26
3.76
0.25
0.33
5.42
45.87
0.19
0.16
0.64
0.97
by gronping variable GCUD (Going-Concern Uncertainty
Minimum
0
-100
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
Maximum
16.57
100
1
9
1
1
17
334
1
1
1
6
It is noted that in 22 cases of the 1176, the percentage of clients gainec
considered as outliers and the
GCUD sample
Mean Rank
(Sum of Ranks)
514.47
(101351)
25th percentile: 10.86
median: 11.93
75th percentile: 12.72
613.48
(117788)
25th percentile: -2.74
median: 2.22
75th percentile: 11.34
490.66
(95188.5)
25th percentile: 2
median: 3
75th percentile: 4
458.63
(90809)
25th percentile: 5
median: 6
75th percentile: 6
405.83
(80353)
25th percentile: 22.75
median: 35
75th percentile: 64.25
625.67
(91973)
25th percentile: 1
median: 2
75th percentile: 3
percentage of clients
No GCUD sample
Mean Rank
(Sum of Ranks)
599.88
(583683)
25th percentile: 11
median: 12.24
75th percentile: 13
570.93
(549802)
25th percentile: -3
median: 2.1
75th percentile: 11
598.54
(578191.5)
25th percentile: 3
median: 4
75th percentile: 5
370.16
(216911)
25th percentile: 5
median: 5
75th percentile: 6
388
(227366)
25th percentile: 22
median: 30
75th percentile: 51
(281707)
392.90
25th percentile: 0
median: 1
75th percentile: 1
gained was set at 1
Median
12.21
11.11
0
4
0
0
5
31
0
0
0
1
i exceeded 100%.
00%.
Mann-Whitney U
(Asymptotic significance
one-tailed)
81848
(0.001)***
35
01
85636
(0.053)*
7
11
76273.5
(0.000)***
44920
(0.000)***
55375
(0.169)
24304
(0.000)***
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Table 2 (continued)
B6NB6
MANDATE
LOCB
LOCW
LOCF
BANKRUPT
GCUD sample
B6;30.1%
NB6; 69.9%
First years; 71.1%
Last year; 28.9%
Brussels; 22.7%
Not in Brussels; 77.3%
Wallonia; 22.2%
Not in Wallonia; 77.8%
Flanders; 57.1%
Not in Flanders; 42.9%
Bankrupt; 73.2%
Non-bankrupt; 26.8%
No GCUD sample
B6; 25.3%
NB6; 74.7%
First years; 75.5%
Last year; 24.5%
Brussels; 18.6%
Not in Brussels; 81.4%
Wallonia; 15%
Not in Wallonia; 85%
Flanders; 66.6%
Not in Flanders; 33.4%
Bankrupt; 25.3%
Non-bankrupt; 74.7%
Pearson y}
(Asymptotic significance
one-tailed)
1.874
(0.085) *
1.667
(0.098) *
1.793
(0.090) *
6.26
(0.006) ***
6.521
(0.005) ***
170.557
(0.000) ***
***; p < 1% ; ** ; p < 5% ; * ; p < 10%
where;
LNFEE Natural logarithm of the firm audit fees for the client company, proxied by the sum of oper-
ational and financial revenues.
CLIENTLOSS Number of clients lost or gained by the audit firm during the previous year scaled by the
annual number of firm clients (loss = -; gain = +).
B6NB6 Big 6 auditor or non-Big 6 auditor, binary variable (B6NB6 = 1, in case of Big 6 auditor).
TENURE Length of the auditor-client relationship in years.
MANDATE Indicates in which year of his/her engagement period (mandate) the auditor is, binary vari-
able (MANDATE = 1, in case auditor is in last year of his/her official engagement period).
BANKRUPT Client company went bankrupt or survived, binary variable (BANKRUPT = I, in case of
bankruptcy).
GMDELAY Number of months between the closing of the fiscal year and the date of the annual general
meeting of shareholders.
SUBMLAG Number of days between the date of the annual general meeting of shareholders and the
date of submission of the financial statements to the Belgian National Bank.
LOCB Location of client company in Brussels, binary variable (LOCB = I, in case company is lo-
cated in Brussek).
LOCW Location of client company in Wallonia, binary variable (LOCW = I, in case company is
located in Wallonia).
LOCF Location of client company in Flanders, binary variable (LOCF = 1, in case company is
located in Flanders).
BADNEWS Bad news score based on bad news in the annual report of the Board of Directors (bad
news is considered to be disclosure of: important negative events after closing of the fiscal
year; circumstances which can negatively infiuence the development of the company; ap-
plication of Article 103/104 of Belgian Company Law; other bad news).
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Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation matrix.
As can be seen, the risk of bias due to strotig cor-
relations annong the covariates is minimal.
5.2. Logistic regression analysis
The results of the logistic regression for the total
sample are presented in Table 4. As can be seeti the
observations are well fit by the model, given the
significant model's chi-square (p<0.0001) and the
high association of predicted probabilities with ob-
served responses (85.1% correct.")
As shown in Table 4, the following incentive
variables relating to the auditor's loss function ap-
pear to be significant explanatory variables. First,
higher audit fees tend to decrease the likelihood of
a going-concern uncertainty disclosure in a signif-
icant way^°. Second, recent loss of audit clients ap-
pears to significantly moderate the willingness of
the auditor to disclose going-concern uncertainty
in the audit report. Big 6 auditors are not signifi-
cantly more likely to disclose a going-concern un-
certainty in the audit report. A subdivision of the
total sample into bankrupt companies on the one
hand, and non-bankrupt companies on the other
hand, shows that the B6NB6 variable is not signif-
icant in either of the subsamples.^' The variables
tenure and mandate are no longer significant when
tested in a multivariate way.
The following control variables are significantly
related to a going-concern uncertainty disclosure
in the audit report: a bad financial condition of the
client; a delay of the annual general meeting; a
client company located in an economic weaker
performing region; and bad news in the annual re-
port of the Board of Directors.^^
6. Conclusions
The purpose of this study was to assess whether
the auditor's decision to disclose going-concern
uncertainty is influenced by economic incentives
related to the auditor's loss function. In contrast to
prior research performed in a highly litigious US
business environment, this study was done in a
limited litigious Continental European business
environment, i.e. Belgium. Despite the low risk of
litigation and the fact that most Belgian companies
are privately held, various regulations have been
put into effect to safeguard audit quality in
Belgium. However, this study provides empirical
evidence to support the contention that the audi-
tor's going-concern opinion decision in Belgium is
significantly associated with factors surrogating
the perceived consequences of disclosing a going-
concern uncertainty. Specifically, the results sug-
gest that recent loss of audit clients appears to
significantly moderate the auditor's going-concern
opinion decision. Moreover, the results of the
study suggest that higher audit fees decrease the
willingness of the auditor to disclose going-con-
cern uncertainty. No evidence was found that the
auditor's going-concern opinion decision is signif-
icantly influenced by the length of the auditor-
client relationship,^^ year of mandate, and auditor
type. This alleviates to some extent the concern
that auditors may not act independently.
These results are to some extent different from
the study of Louwers (1998), based on US data, in
which no evidence was found for the fact that au-
ditors' incentives play a role in the issuance of a
going-concern modification. Indeed, none of the
incentive variables related to the auditor's loss
function was significant. A potential explanation
for the difference in results could be that US audi-
tors perceive the risk of litigation as higher than
the potential losses of disclosing going-concern
uncertainty. In other words, due to the high-liti-
gious business environment in the US, litigation
may be a dominant factor in the economic trade-
off made by the auditor and consequently other au-
ditors' incentives may not come into play. This
latter statement would also be consistent with both
theoretical (Magee and Tseng, 1990) and empirical
(DeFond and Subramanyam, 1999) research.
In addition, this study showed that the auditor's
going-concern opinion decision is significantly re-
lated to: a bad financial condition; the location of
a client company; bad news in the annual report of
the Board of Directors which tends to decrease the
conflict of interest between the auditor and the
client management; and a delay of the annual gen-
eral meeting of shareholders which may suggest
lengthy auditor-client negotiations and extensive
auditor testing.
" The prediction accuracy is based on a cut off value of
50%. A cut off value of 33% (since one third of the companies
in the total sample went bankrupt) results in a similar predic-
tion accuracy rate of the model: 83.5%.
^^ It is acknowledged that due to the absence of publicly
available audit fee data, the audit fee proxy variable may seem
less convincing. However, in our opinion, the fee result is not
biased by merely capturing a client size effect, given that we
control for the relation between client size and bankruptcy by
including a bankruptcy dummy in the model. Therefore, we
believe that the audit fee proxy does capture expected rev-
enues and related independence concerns.
•^ ' Also Gaeremynck and Willekens (2001) did not find a
significant reporting difference between Big 6 and non-Big 6
auditors for Belgian companies for which financial difficulties
were obvious and bankruptcy followed. However, they did
find evidence that Big 6 auditors issue more non-clean audit
reports when financial problems are less explicit and volun-
tary liquidation follows.
^^  Following Hopwood et al. (1994), it was checked whether
the results might be biased because of including both finan-
cially stressed and non-stressed firms. To this end, the same
logistic regression analysis was run for the subsample of bank-
rupt companies and financially stressed non-bankrupt compa-
nies. The results remain the same.
2' It is noted that Vanstraelen (2000) did find evidence that
auditors in Belgium are less willing to qualify audit reports in
general (not specifically going-concern qualifications) in case
of long tenure.
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Table 4
Logistic regression results for the period 1992-1996
Dependent variable: GCUD (Disclosure of going-concern problems = 1)
n = 865'
Variable
CONSTANT
LNFEE
CLIENTLOSS
B6NB6
TENURE
MANDATE
BANKRUPT
GMDELAY
LOCB
LOCW
BADNEWS
***: p < 1% ; ** : p < 5% ; * : p < 10%
-2 Log Likelihood: 530.187
Prediction accuracy: 85.1%
Pseudo R-square: 29.69%
Parameter
Estimate
-2.261
-0.245
0.010
0.426
-0.008
0.177
1.796
0.243
0.024
0.490
0.753
Standard
Error
0.883
0.062
0.004
0.261
0.065
0.257
0.248
0.078
0.296
0.290
0.102
Wald
Chi-Square
6.561
15.442
6.763
2.670
0.015
0.476
52.453
9.725
0.007
2.866
54.062
Significance
P<
0.010**
0.000***
0.009***
0.102
0.904
0.490
0.000***
0.002***
0.935
0.090*
0.000***
Model chi-square: 223.890
Degrees of freedom: 10
Significance: 0.000
where:
LNEEE Natural logarithm of the firm audit fees for the client company, proxied by the sum of oper-
ational and financial revenues.
CLIENTLOSS Number of clients lost or gained by the audit firm during the previous year scaled by the
annual number of firm clients (loss = -; gain = +).
B6NB6 Big 6 auditor or non-Big 6 auditor, binary variable (B6NB6 = 1, in case of Big 6 auditor).
TENURE Length of the auditor-client relationship in years.
MANDATE Indicates in which year of his/her engagement period (mandate) the auditor is, binary vari-
able (MANDATE = 1, in case auditor is in last year of his/her official engagement period).
BANKRUPT Client company went bankrupt or survived, binary variable (BANKRUPT = 1, in case of
bankruptcy).
GMDELAY Number of months between the closing of the fiscal year and the date of the annual general
meeting of shareholders.
LOCB Location of client company in Brussels, binary variable (LOCB = 1, in case company is lo-
cated in Brussels).
LOCW Location of client company in Wallonia, binary variable (LOCW = 1, in case company is
located in Wallonia).
BADNEWS Bad news score based on bad news in the annual report of the Board of Directors (bad news
is considered to be disclosure of: important negative events after closing of the fiscal year;
circumstances which can negatively influence the development of the company; application
of Article 103/104 of Belgian Company Law; other bad news).
' The annual report of the Board of Directors was not available for all companies in the sample. For the bankrupt
sample, the annual report of the Board of Directors was missing in 26.8% (105) of the cases, for the sample
financially stressed firms in 30.6% (120) of the cases and for the sample of financially non-stressed firms
in 21.9% (86) of the cases. Therefore, the number of observations in the logistic regression analysis reduces
to 865.
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The results of this study are subject to the fol-
lowing limitations. First, due to data unavailabili-
ty, it was not possible to work with actual fee data.
Secondly, there may be other incentive variables
related to the auditor's loss function which are not
captured by the model. Thirdly, a potential omitted
variable problem in the going-concern opinion
model can never entirely be overcome.
Further research could provide additional evi-
dence on whether these results hold in other limit-
ed litigious business environments.
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